LONDON, 9 September, 2019 – Spare a thought for the poorer residents of Jakarta, Indonesia’s sprawling capital city.
If your house on the Indonesian coast is threatened by the ocean because of climate change, then maybe – if you’re lucky and wealthy enough – a move to higher ground further inland may be possible.
But what happens when a whole city, with millions of people, is threatened by rising seas?
Jakarta has a population of more than 10 million. Established as the capital of what was the Dutch East Indies in the 17th century, the city is built on swamp land on the north-west coast of the island of Java.
But not only is Jakarta threatened by rising sea levels: rapid, largely unplanned expansion and building work has resulted in the city becoming, according to experts, one of the fastest-sinking urban areas in the world.
It’s estimated that up to 40% of the area of Jakarta is now below sea level. In northern districts of the city bordering the sea, rising sea levels are threatening many neighbourhoods, and flooding is common.
“This huge project will need to be done quickly to prevent Jakarta from sinking into the sea”
Attempts at tackling the issue have so far made little impact. A scheme designed to keep seawater out involving the construction of a 32 kilometre-long outer sea wall called the Great Garuda and 17 artificial islands straddling Jakarta Bay has been subject to long delays and finance problems.
“This huge project will need to be done quickly to prevent Jakarta from sinking into the sea”, says Joko Widodo, Indonesia’s president.
Ongoing extraction of groundwater from beneath the city is another serious problem, leading to frequent land subsidence.
Parts of Jakarta are sinking by as much as 25 cms each year. Experts say that in some areas the land has sunk by 2.5 metres over the last 10 years.
Officials talk of creating a “smart and forest” city; the project, which has an initial price tag of US$33 billion (466,650 bn Rupiah), will involve the foundation of a new administrative capital, with up to 1.5 million civil servants being relocated.
Jakarta will retain its role as Indonesia’s commercial and financial hub. The government says work on the new city is due to begin in two years’ time and to be completed by 2024.
The construction of the new capital might go some way to settle one set of problems, but is likely to give birth to others.
Experts point out that many environmentally important areas of Borneo have already been destroyed by haphazard, badly planned development projects. They say the new plans, including the construction of a whole city, are only going to make the situation worse.
The daunting prospect facing Jakarta is likely to confront many other countries within the next few decades. Last month US researchers said the rising threat of flooding caused by climate change meant Americans should prepare for managed retreat from their own coasts.
Nature based solutions, including coral reef restoration and artificial coral reefs, protect one of tourism’s primary draws – the beach.
White sandy beaches and year-round summer temperatures attract tens of millions of tourists each year to destinations like the Caribbean. Tourism remains a vital source of economic development for tourist hotspots. Even in countries with a colder climate, where beaches don’t attract international acclaim, they are often places of community gathering and recreation.
beach is an attraction in and of itself and, at the same time, provides coastal
protection for communities and infrastructure from erosion and in-land flood
risk. However, beaches themselves are prone to degradation by extreme weather
events (such as hurricanes) and daily tidal activity, thereby reducing the
beaches aesthetic appeal and capacity for coastal protection. Maintaining beach
resilience should, therefore, be an important priority for coastal and
Various technologies have been deployed world-wide for beach protection, with the ‘quick and dirty’ solution being sand re-nourishment projects. In the U.S. the government has funded to the order of US$ 9 billion for such projects, which entail the dumping sand in regions where beaches have eroded. This option is costly and temporary and to a long-term problem that is likely to worsen with climate change. Construction of hard and semi-hard infrastructure (such as sea-walls, groynes and breakwaters) have also been deployed globally and in certain instances have provided important coastal protection services. However, they carry the possibility of to adjacent non-protected areas and are considered an eye-sore in scenic and tourist areas.
In recent years, natural and hybrid approaches to beach erosion and sand loss have been piloted. These Nature-based Solution (NbS) include coral reef restoration, artificial coral reef construction, natural engineering projects, and sand and dune restoration. NbS can protect against beach erosion, while delivering a series of co-benefits, some of which may generate income streams. For example, coral reefs can dissipate up to 97% of incident wave energy and provide revenue generating opportunities associated with snorkeling, diving, fishing, aquarium trade and more. There is no one-size-fits all solution to the site-specific complexity of beach erosion, however several innovative examples illustrate how NbS can be leveraged to offer coastal protection services.
What are Nature Based
There are an abundance of NbS
definitions, and no universally accepted one. In short, NBS are those that that
are designed, inspired or supported by nature. Here’s one definition from the
European Commission’s Directorate General for Research and Innovation: NbS are solutions
“which aim to help societies address
a variety of environmental, social and economic challenges in sustainable ways,
including actions which are inspired by, supported by or copied from nature. NbS
use the features and complex system processes of nature, such as its ability to
store carbon and regulate water flow, in order to achieve desired outcomes,
such as reduced disaster risk, improved human well-being and socially inclusive
get a better understanding of what this entails, it is helpful to look at
examples from practice around the world.
Now Jade Hotel, Mayan Riviera Mexico, Artificial Coral Reef
The Now Jade Riviera
Cancún Resort and Spa (“Now Jade”) is located in the popular tourist
destination of Puerto Morelos, Mexico on the Mayan Riviera, in close proximity
to the Mesoamerican reef. In 2008, Now Jade embarked on a long-term beach
restoration program focused on the construction of two modular artificial reefs
and future restoration of the sand-dune ecosystem.
Prior to 2007, the
Puerto Morels beach experienced a pattern of sand accretion in summer months
and retreat during winter months, with sufficient year-round sand for tourist
activities. In 2007, the coast was hit by hurricane-induced waves which caused
high volumes of sand to travel from north to south. An adjacent breakwater
stopped the longitudinal currents and induced chronic erosion of the beach. In
2010, with the beach narrowing with on-going erosion, it was decided that beach
resilience efforts were necessary to regenerate the sand.
Several options for
coastal protection were considered including hard structures. However, tourist-specific
considerations required that the structure be not only aesthetic, but also
ecologically friendly. An artificial coral reef was selected for the following
reasons; reefs are effective at wave energy dissipation, the proximity of the
Mesoamerican Reef would facilitate species colonization, the dynamics of sand
transport had already been negatively affected by the existing breakwater and
the artificial reef would bolster the conservation and tourist appeal of the
Following a series of site-specific assessments and laboratory tests, the reefs, made out of pre-fabricated concrete elements, were constructed 120 meters offshore. Five years after construction, an assessment showed that the reefs have contributed to beach recovery, with a natural growth and retreat cycle, and attracted fish and coral colonies from the nearby Mesoamerican Reef. An influx of Sargassum seaweed in 2015 created a temporary decline in reef colonization, however since then the reef has been recovering biological richness in the absence of human intervention.
Mayacoba Resorts: Coastal restoration project
is home to four luxury resorts located on the Mayan Riviera; Andaz Mayakoba, RoseWood
Mayakoba, Fairmont Mayakoba and Banyan Tree Mayakoba. As with other beaches in
the region, Mayakoba has experienced significant sand loss to the order of 15
feet per year since 2005, spurred by two hurricane events. This presents
significant challenges for resorts, which off the primary attraction of long,
white sandy beaches for guest enjoyment. Furthermore, beach erosion could negatively
impact 150 acres of protected mangroves surrounding the resorts, which are home
to alligators, turtles, and various bird species, and even further undermine
the resorts coastal resiliency.
in consortium with local organizations, embarked on reef restoration efforts to
enhance coastal protection services and biodiversity. Scientists transplanted
fragments from a coral nursey onto a concrete grid on the ocean floor on the
Mayakoba coast. The artificial reef is expected to connect with the nearby
existing natural reef to form a self-sustaining colony, capable of providing
coastal protection services.
of spring 2018, initial trials were performing well with the Elkhorn coral
thriving in the concrete barriers. It is expected to take two years for the
coral to mature into a strong colony and four years for the coral to start
reproducing. Once mature, the reef is expected to help protect Mayakoba beaches
from erosion, and attract fish and marine life to create a more desirable
attraction for snorkelers and divers.
Fairmont even offers a ‘Coral Reef Restoration Package’ where guests can
participate in restoration efforts as a part of their stay. Twenty Five percent
of revenues from this package are redirected to fund reef restoration efforts. The
resort is able to capture an additional revenue stream through this package,
offering an additional economic incentive for investment in coastal
are a series of challenges that could compromise the corals restoration
efforts, and the services they provide. This includes coral bleaching driven by
increased sea surface temperatures and sunlight exposure, sargassum influx,
extreme events (i.e. hurricanes that cause structural damage to the reef, and
industrial run-off. The inability to effectively regulate the anthropogenic activities
(i.e. greenhouse gas emissions, and agricultural runoff) creates a challenge
for the successful revival of coral reefs.
Netherland’s Sand Motor
The Dutch have long been striving to protect their low-lying country from sea level rise and coastal erosion. In the past, the sand dunes on the Dutch peninsula were replenished every 5-year, via sand shipment from the North Sea. However, the Dutch wanted to pilot a lasting solution that would allow the country’s southwest beaches to regenerate on their own, a popular kite-surfing destination and recreational area for the urban population.
creation of the Sand Motor, a large artificial hook shaped peninsula, changed
the dynamics of the winds, waves and currents to gradually spread sand along
the coast and form a new dune landscape and wider beach. The sand motor was
initially constructed with 21.5 million cubic meters spread across an area of
128 hectares, and natural processes are expected to add an additional 35
hectares to the coast over a 10 km stretch in the next 20 years. By depositing
a large volume of sand at once, the sand motor avoids repeated disruption to
Preliminary 5-year results of the Sand Motor show that it is acting mostly as expected, supplying sand to a five kilometer stretch of beach, with 1.5 million cubic meters of sand moved to the north, and nearly 1 million cubic meters moved to the south. Only dune growth in the coastal area near the Sand Motor is progressing slower than expected. The expansion of the beach has provided a greater area for community recreation and outdoor activities, and has become somewhat of a tourist attraction in itself. Long-term analysis of the Sand Motor (20 years) will ultimately show whether it is a viable solution, and can be reproduced as a coastal management strategy in other countries.
Please see this publication for further information on the Sand Motor.
Challenges of these projects and steps forward
These case studies provide insight into a variety of NbS that can be deployed for coastal protection. The solutions are not driven by an ecological imperative, but rather a coastal protection one that delivers ecological co-benefits. This distinction is important as it puts NbS on the same playing field as engineered solutions. A solution that effectively fulfills the coastal protection imperative in a cost-effective way, while delivering a series of co-benefits (that traditional infrastructure does not) will generate win-win results for businesses, communities and tourists.
A series of authoritative governmental and nongovernmental analyses over more than three decades lays a strong foundation for concern over climate change implications for national security.
Most recently, the national intelligence community – including the Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other federal agencies – in January 2019 submitted the annual “Worldwide Threat Assessment.” In it, the intelligence agencies stated that “climate change is an urgent and growing threat to our national security, contributing to increased natural disasters, refugee flows, and conflicts over basic resources such as food and water. These impacts are already occurring, and the scope, scale, and intensity of these impacts are projected to increase over time.”
That report from National Intelligence Director Daniel R. Coats, a former U.S. Republican senator from Indiana, was just the most recent in a long string of analyses that any upcoming challenges to such conclusions will have to address. Those conclusions clearly are at odds with the Trump administration’s efforts to undermine and reverse federal climate policies, and they cast doubt on the President’s next day tweet that “Perhaps Intelligence should go back to school!”
With the White House now reportedly consideringan executive order to establish a Presidential Committee on Climate Security that would contest such findings, it’s useful to review the history of climate change/national security official reports and findings. Although it’s unclear where the internal White House thinking on such a committee will lead, it’s been authoritatively reported that the push for such an effort is led by two individuals – Will Happer and Steven Koonin – widely known to have climate change views far different from those of the “established” science community as represented, for instance, by IPCC and the National Academy of Sciences.
Former Princeton physicist Will Happer, now with the White House staff, has a long history of scientifically challenged views about climate science. In the past a frequent favorite witness before House hearings overseen by members rejecting the climate science community “consensus,” Happer has acknowledged in a court case receiving funding from Peabody Coal and from other fossil fuel interests. In 2015 the New York Times reported that he was caught in a Greenpeace “sting” agreeing to take money from unknown Middle Eastern oil and gas interests in exchange for writing a report challenging climate science. Steven Koonin has written on blogs and in the Wall Street Journal pieces in stark contrast to the view of the overwhelming scientific consensus.
Concerned about reports of a potential new presidential review of climate change and national security, 58 former military and intelligence officials on March 5 sent a letter to the president cautioning that “imposing a political test on reports issued by the science agencies, and forcing a blind spot onto the national security assessments that depend on them, will erode our national security.”
Three decades of climate national security warnings
Climate and water resources expert Peter Gleick, in a recent review of more than 100 national security documents addressing climate change, has assessed decades of official national security strategy documents prepared to guide Democratic and Republican administrations on national defense priorities and military strategy. Those analyses began warning about threats to U.S. national security from environmental factors in the late 1980s, and in 1990, a U.S. Naval War College Report warned of potential climate change hazards:
Naval operations in the coming half century may be drastically affected by the impact of global climate change. For the Navy to be fully prepared for operations in this future climate environment, resources of both mind and money must be committed to the problem.
President George H.W. Bush’s national security strategy in August 1991 acknowledged climate change as a security issue. In 2003, concerned by research documenting past instances of abrupt climate changes, the Pentagon commissioned a report with the name “An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for United States National Security.” The report authors wrote:
an abrupt climate change scenario could potentially destabilize the geo-political environment, leading to skirmishes, battles, and even war … Violence and disruption stemming from the stresses created by abrupt changes in the climate pose a different type of threat to national security than we are accustomed to today.
They concluded their report cautioning about climate disruption and conflict becoming “endemic features of life.”
Fast forward to 2007: A group of retired three- and four-star admirals and generals working with the Center for Naval Analyses wrote a report on “National Security and the Threat of Climate Change.” Their report recommended that “The U.S. should commit to a stronger national and international role to help stabilize climate change at levels that will avoid signiﬁcant disruption to global security and stability.” The authors concluded by saying:
Climate change can act as a threat multiplier for instability in some of the most volatile regions of the world, and it presents signiﬁcant national security challenges for the United States. Accordingly, it is appropriate to start now to help mitigate the severity of some of these emergent challenges. The decision to act should be made soon in order to plan prudently for the nation’s security. The increasing risks from climate change should be addressed now because they will almost certainly get worse if we delay.
A year later, the National Intelligence Council judged that more than 30 U.S. military installations were already facing elevated levels of risk from rising sea levels.
Assessments conducted by the intelligence community indicate that climate change could have significant geopolitical impacts around the world, contributing to poverty, environmental degradation, and the further weakening of fragile governments. Climate change will contribute to food and water scarcity, will increase the spread of disease, and may spur or exacerbate mass migration.
While climate change alone does not cause conflict, it may act as an accelerant of instability or conflict, placing a burden to respond on civilian institutions and militaries around the world.
The prognoses got no less worrisome when in 2014 the subsequent Quadrennial Defense Review again cautioned that climate change acts as a threat multiplier:
Climate change poses another significant challenge for the United States and the world at large. As greenhouse gas emissions increase, sea levels are rising, average global temperatures are increasing, and severe weather patterns are accelerating. These changes, coupled with other global dynamics, including growing, urbanizing, more affluent populations, and substantial economic growth in India, China, Brazil, and other nations, will devastate homes, land, and infrastructure. Climate change may exacerbate water scarcity and lead to sharp increases in food costs. The pressures caused by climate change will influence resource competition while placing additional burdens on economies, societies, and governance institutions around the world. These effects are threat multipliers that will aggravate stressors abroad such as poverty, environmental degradation, political instability, and social tensions – conditions that can enable terrorist activity and other forms of violence.
In 2015, responding to a Congressional request, the Department of Defense stated that climate change is posing “a present security threat, not strictly a long-term risk … the Department is beginning to include the implications of a changing climate in its frameworks for managing operational and strategic risks prudently.”
There’s more. Many of those same concerns were echoed in the Trump administration’s January 2019 Department of Defense report documenting vulnerabilities of 79 military installations to events exacerbated by climate change impacts such as floods, droughts, and wildfires. As just one example, Naval Station Norfolk – the world’s largest naval base – is already experiencing frequent sunny-day flooding.
It’s unclear at this point just when – and even whether – the Trump administration will proceed with establishing a formal overview of climate change/national security links. What is clear is that any such review will have an extensive body of previous official reports to upend if it ends up reflecting conflicting viewpoints.
As the demand for climate services grows, questions are beginning to be asked about the assumptions behind some of the tools and methods used to translate climate science into information that can be used by decision-makers. Many of these assumptions are considered to be proprietary, and therefore exist within a ‘black box’, with end users unable to scrutinise the methodologies. This means that users are not able to fully understand the assumptions that underpin the findings of the climate risk analysis, and the recommended course of action. Are we making resilience decisions in the dark?
There are an estimated 350 commercial climate and weather services providers in the U.S., a rapidly growing figure as the market continues to mature, and the impacts of climate change to commerce become more frequent and intense. In the U.S., commercial service providers rely on publicly available data, from agencies like NOAA and NASA, to develop value-added products and services for decision-support. This may be targeted at a particular sector, or in relation to a particular climate or weather hazard. An example of a value-added service could include a flood risk assessment tool that alerts property developers to flood risk potential. The property developer leverages this information to avoid investment in a particular area or build to withstand future flood risk potential.
The U.S. model of free and open access to data has created the foundation for a commercial value-added weather service industry that has enabled a sub-sector worth around $7 billion. For meteorologists or technological savvy entrepreneurs, this presents a large market opportunity to develop value-added tools based on information that is freely available. While anybody could theoretically access NOAA or NASA data to inform climate and weather-related decision-making the data is usually not available in formats that are accessible to a non-expert user. Therefore, the value-added process is an important step to make the information useable, and inform decision-making.
The users of the products likely do not understand the climate and weather data behind the applications, nor the value-added processes that render this information usable. The end results – a level of risk, or a dollar sign – may be the only information they are interested in. However, for those users that want to dig a bit deeper into the data and processes that inform the service, they may run into a black box. In crude terms, the general approach to developing a client-facing service appears to be: meteorological data (i.e. NOAA / NASA) + other data + client specific information + proprietary algorithm = value-added service.
While service providers may disclose the meteorological information that they are accessing (such as station data from NOAA) the process of adding value to this information is often considered proprietary. Commercial service providers generally do not disclose their methodology in fear of compromising their cutting edge against a competitor. They provide demos of the service but do not open up the contents. This raises the question of how can the products be open to scrutiny and comparison if they are proprietary? How can a user make an informed decision between one service and the next, if they don’t have substantial information about either?
Importantly, there is no consensus on governance standards for developing, or applying climate services (Adams et al, 2015). The WMO’s Global Framework on Climate Services is guiding the development of climate services for decision-support in climate sensitive sectors, particularly in developing countries, however there is no entity – to our knowledge – vetting commercial applications.
Climate services are a big and growing industry, with new firms continuing to enter the market. As individuals and businesses are increasingly making risk-management decisions based on the output of these services, worth large sums of money, what mechanisms are in place to ensure the integrity of these services? Will the black boxes become more transparent? Will a third-party be allowed to peer inside the black boxes? Or will the market grow in a similar to that of the catastrophe modeling industry where black boxes are the norm
With the Arctic heating up twice as fast as the rest
of the world, the borders its sea ice once protected are being left exposed. That
so-called unpaid sentry is disappearing fast, giving way to not just new shipping
routes but also security challenges countries in the region are reacting to.
Sea ice in the Arctic is being lost at a staggering rate of over 10,000 tonnes per second, by 2035 the region could be ice-free during summer. Speaking to The Guardian, Klaus Dodds, professor of geopolitics at Royal Holloway, University of London, explained “The unique Arctic security architecture has shape and form that come from natural extremities. If the Arctic becomes just another ocean, this breaks down. It’s elemental.”
This is also the reason why military activity in the
Arctic is increasing: the prospect of a completely open water body is cause for
concern among countries that until recently relied on sea ice for securing
their northern borders. However, it should be emphasised that an increase in
military activity does not imply imminent conflict. Comparing the situation to
that in the South China Sea – where nations compete not through combat but by
demonstrating presence – former Norwegian defence minister Espen Barth Eide
said “It’s not because there is an immediate threat, it’s that, as an area
becomes more important, it’s natural to have a heightened military presence.”
With national security concerns also comes an
increased sense of competition for the growing business interest in the region.
The Northern Sea Route from Asia to Europe can save ships up to 20 days travel
time as opposed to the Southern Sea Route (Suez Canal passage). Parts of the northern
passage historically have only been ice-free for two months each year. However,
as mentioned above, that is rapidly changing. Remote places like Tromsø in Norway
are becoming bustling tourism and business hubs. “Now we have a historically
strange situation with political and economic activity in the Arctic. So many
people are knocking on our door, including business and state representatives
from China, Pakistan, Singapore and Morocco,” said Tromsø mayor Kristin Røymo.
The receding ice is a massive game changer, especially for Russia. Not only does the country have the largest border in the Arctic region but must of the Northern Sea Route currently extends across Russia’s exclusive economic zone. As long as the ice doesn’t recede beyond that zone, Russia will get paid by anyone who uses that shipping route. But as sea ice recedes further, ships will be able to travel in international waters. China, an observing member of the Arctic Council since 2013, is one of the countries exploring this possibility and the potential for infrastructure investments in a “Polar Silk Road”, threatening the exclusive position Russia has been in historically.
In addition to the growing interest in the Arctic for its shorter shipping routes, oil & gas companies are sniffing their chance at exploring new oil and gas fields. Norway came under fire earlier this year for having approved over 80 new exploration licenses. At the Arctic Frontiers conference in January, environmentalists highlighted the dual role of oil as both a driver of climate change, which is heavily impacting the Arctic, and as a driver of increasing resource extraction in one of the most fragile and pristine environments on this planet. These tensions and the growing competition are also putting into question peaceful cross-border cooperation efforts that held up even during the cold war and regulated fishing, scientific research and even reindeer herding.
As custodians of vast areas of land and sea, the UK’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) must manage assets and adapt to climate change to ensure it can continue to meet the UK’s defence requirements.
UK Defence strategy and priorities
The UK’s national security has increasingly been making headlines in recent years, with concern over the threat of international terrorism, destabilisation in Europe and the rise of new and old global powers. One threat that has been less well publicised however, is that posed by climate change to its defence infrastructure and capabilities. This threat was officially recognised by the coalition Government in their 2010 paper A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy. Alongside international terrorism and hostile attacks upon UK cyber space, the paper recognised “A major accident or natural hazard which requires a national response, such as severe coastal flooding affecting three or more regions of the UK…” as being a Tier 1 Priority Risk.
Although it highlights climate change threats, the strategy is focused more on the physical effects of climate change becoming “increasingly significant as a ‘risk multiplier’, exacerbating existing tensions around the world,”rather than the potential of climate change to affect defence infrastructure and training capabilities here in the UK.
Climate-related threats to defence estate
The MoD is one of the UK’s largest landlords, owning and holding rights to over 431,300 hectares, or1.8% of the UK land mass. As well as owning strategically important defence infrastructure,such as nuclear submarine bases and munitions stores, it also owns and manages sites of ecologically and historically important land, with management responsibility for approximately 170 designated Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI) and Special Areas of Conservation (SAC), many of which are of international significance.
The impacts of climate change are already being felt on the MoD estate. Some coastal sites have experienced increased flood events in low-lying areas such as Kent and Pembrokeshire, leading to periodic site closures and the interruption of military training. An article in The Telegraph highlighted the impact of coastal flooding on MoD sites, saying that “Many of the military’s most important facilities, including RAF Brize Norton, the RoyalNavy bases at Plymouth and Portsmouth, and the Ministry of Defence’s headquarters in London, face a ‘direct impact’ from floods by 2020.” Fires on training areas such as Sennybridge and Salisbury Plain have historically occurred, particularly during live firing exercises, however these have increased in frequency, with 2018 recording a higher number of incidents than previous years. Following the dry spell in June this year, exhaust fumes from a US Osprey aircraft caused a fire which destroyed 150 hectares of dry grassland on the Sennybridge Training Area in the Brecon Beacons, Wales. IT services have also been disrupted during periods of extreme heat, with significant security implications.
As well as these major events,more extreme weather has led to an increase in building and rural maintenance work and related costs. Many buildings on the defence estate date back to the1950s and are susceptible to wind, rain and heat damage. The winter storms of2017 saw a significant increase in damage to roofs, fences and trees, requiring costly repairs and disruption to training.
Measuring the impact of climate change
The Defence Infrastructure Organisation (DIO) developed the Climate Impacts Risk Assessment Methodology (CIRAM) in order to take steps to identify the estate’s vulnerabilities on a site-by-site basis and build adaptive capacity where required [Editor’s note: The first iteration of CIRAM was co-developed by Acclimatise]. The CIRAM process “identifies the risks to defence outputs from current and future climate or extreme weather events, and identifies the actions required to maintain and optimise operational capability,” supporting a number of UK government programmes.
Identify site objectives and critical operational functions in delivering its defence output
Collation of site information (infrastructure and assets) and identification of potential issues
Collection of historic and projected climatic information for the site
Stage B– Risk workshop and production of a Climate Resilience Risk Register (CRRR)
Organising and delivering the risk assessment workshop
Facilitating the working sessions and completing the CRRR
Identifying actions, processes and owners
Stage C– Post-workshop review
Stage D– Implementation
Adoption of CRRR and implementation with short,medium and long-term actions
Integration with management processes
Monitoring and review (full review every five years)
Adapting to climate change
As with any business, the findings of the CIRAM process often highlight the need for interdepartmental communication and planning and recognises areas that are likely to need to be addressed in order to protect vital defence infrastructure and maintain the operational capability and training requirements of the UK’s armed forces.Common areas that are likely to require action as a result of the CIRAM process include:
Strategic estate planning – the location, operation and maintenance of facilities may need to change
Equipment– specification and location of equipment may need to change
Health and safety policy – new risks may arise e.g. increased risk of fires or flooding
Personnel policy – working practices and skills may need to change
Infrastructure design and construction – major and minor project siting and specifications may need to be future climate proofed
Operational activities and training emphasis – may need to be revised to adapt to changing threats e.g. increased requirement of military to assist with natural disasters
As well as becoming a contributing factor to future global conflicts in which the UK is involved, climate change is also shaping the UK’s defence requirements, its estate management and its spending priorities. One of the major challenges for the defence estate is to ensure that it recognises and manages the risk posed by climate change, and adapts its infrastructure, its strategic and operational planning and its delivery accordingly.
About the author: Ben Sears PIEMA, PGCE Geography, BSc (Hons) Environmental Protection
Ben Sears is an environmental and sustainability consultant,currently working on a major rail project on his doorstep in Wales, UK. He has experience in civil and commercial construction and is also a qualified Geography teacher.Ben’s main areas of interest include climate adaptation engineering, sustainable procurement and natural philosophy.
Cover photo by Philip Halling/Wikimedia (CC BY-SA 2.0): Entering the Sennybridge Training Area Here the B4519 enters the Sennybridge Training Area.
Climate effects strike US military installations today, a Pentagon study finds, despite White House failure to recognise any threat.
Once more, the administration of President Trump seems puzzled about how seriously – if at all – it should regard how climate effects strike US military abilities.
In December the president listed the global threats he reckoned the US was facing – and climate change didn’t get a mention. Now, though, the US Department of Defense says many of its bases are feeling the worrying impacts of – climate change.
Around half of US military bases worldwide are already experiencing those impacts, a Pentagon report says. A survey shows risks to military infrastructure related to climate and extreme weather are widespread, affecting nearly 50% of the 1,684 sites involved.
The survey, described as a vulnerability assessment, identifies several key categories of risk: flooding, both from storm surges and causes such as rain, snow, ice and river overflows; extreme heat and cold; wind; drought; and wildfire. The Pentagon says the risks are not confined to vulnerable coastal sites.
The survey paints what the Center for Climate & Security (CCS), a US non-partisan policy institute composed of security and military experts, calls “a concerning picture of current climate change-related risks to military installations both at home and abroad”.
“This report represents the first survey of climate impacts across the Department of Defense’s installation enterprise, and while it does not detail specific impacts, the breadth of impacts it reports is significant.
“No region is immune from climate impacts. This work will form the foundation of vulnerability assessments and mitigation planning in the future.”
“What is potentially significant about this survey … is how widespread climate change-related risks to military assets already are”
As rapid climate change is projected to intensify most of these risks during this century, the CCS says, it is reasonable to expect that military sites will become more vulnerable unless significant resources are devoted to adaptation, or the rate and scale of climate change are reduced.
“What is potentially significant about this survey … is how widespread climate change-related risks to military assets already are”, it says.
The vulnerability statement insists that the Pentagon will do what it thinks necessary to protect its bases: “Our warfighters require bases from which to deploy, on which to train, or to live when they are not deployed.
“If extreme weather makes our critical facilities unusable or necessitates costly or manpower-intensive work-arounds, that is an unacceptable impact.”
The CCS says the survey makes it clear that climate change is already affecting the US military’s ability to do its job, finding that many installations are “highly vulnerable to a variety of different types of extreme or severe weather events. Scientists expect heat waves, flooding, drought and wildfires to all increase over the coming decades.”
On the president’s December failure to include climate change in his list of global security threats to the US, Mr Conger said: “While it is unfortunate that mention of climate was dropped from the strategy, it isn’t surprising.
“I expect the US military will continue to focus on mission assurance efforts and it clearly recognises climate change is one of the risks it must consider. The omission won’t block the DoD from working on climate resilience, but its reduction in priority is likely to slow progress.”
Earlier this summer, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Jim Mattis, expressed his view that climate change is real and poses a threat to national security. Following his January confirmation hearing, Mattis provided written answers to “Questions for the Record” from several senators. ProPublica , an American non-profit investigative news site, published excerpts from the answers. In the exchange, Mattis emphasized that climate change poses a threat to the Pentagon’s assets and interests abroad, and confirmed the Department of Defense’s commitment to mitigating the consequences of climate change.
Climate change and the Pentagon
The Pentagon has long recognized the security threats the changing climate will bring, and has taken them into consideration when planning operations. In 2016, President Obama commissioned a report on the national security implications of climate change, and ordered federal agencies, including the Department of Defense, to fully consider climate change-related impacts on national security in policies and plans.
This report identified possible timelines and pathways for the physical, social, political, and economic effects of climate change on national security. It listed threats to the stability of countries, heightened social and political tensions, adverse effects on food availability, increased risks to human health, negative impacts on investments, and potential climate discontinuities as the principal pathways through which climate change will impact national security. It also found that during the next five years, the main climate-related threat will come from distinct extreme weather events and climate-related stress on currently strained conditions. Additionally, during the next 20 years, the principal threat will arise from disturbances and changes in broader climatic systems, such as sea level rise.
Mattis’ Strategic Focus on Climate Change
Mattis has held this stance on climate change for quite some time. In 2003, Mattis famously stated that the military must be “unleashed from the tether of fuel” – a view he reiterated in his recent written responses. Although he has taken this stance for a variety of reasons, he illustrated the Department of Defense’s commitment to exploring renewable energy, where it makes sense for them. Furthermore, when Mattis was commander of the U.S. Joint Forces Command, he signed off on Joint Operating Environment, a document that listed climate change as one of the principal security threats the military will face in the next quarter-century.
In his written answers, Mattis expressed his concern for climate change as a driver of instability and alter political dynamics. For example, he stressed that climate-related drought and water shortages are already impacting the stability of areas where US troops are stationed, particularly in the Middle East. He also cited the increased maritime access in the Artic due to the reduction of ice cover, as a key climate related change that will have significant impact on the Unite States’ security situation, as well as the political climate of the North Atlantic.
Mattis described climate change as a broad challenge that will require a “whole-of government” response to address. He reassured the senators that the Department of Defense is prepared to mitigate and adapt to the changing climate. He wrote of the Pentagon’s plans to continue incorporating the impacts of climate change into defense planning and operations. He also wrote that the Pentagon is committed to ensuring that shipyards and bases will continue to function as required, in the face of rising sea levels and drought. Mattis’ written statements signal to other countries that, despite pulling out of the Paris Agreement, the US is still engaged in addressing climate change.
Cover photo by US Secretary of Defense/Flickr (CC BY 2.0): Jim Mattis during a visit to the United Arab Emirates earlier this year.
The Syrian civil war has raged for more than six years now. You’ve probably heard the following story linking it to climate change: an intense drought, made more likely thanks to global warming, caused “mass migration” within the country from rural to urban areas, which in turn contributed to the 2011 uprising which then escalated into civil conflict.
This narrative assumes that there is a relationship between drought, migration and conflict. However, the connection is not so clear-cut. Our worry is that putting too much emphasis on the climate overlooks the role of political and socio-economic factors in determining a community’s vulnerability to environmental stress. Conflict is not inevitable in the face of drought.
That’s one conclusion from our work on drought and resource management in Syria. In our research, we broke down the popular “climate war” claim into two parts – the link between drought and migration, and the link between migration and conflict – to see if and how these factors fit together.
We started with the very idea of environmentally induced migration. The problem is that it’s very difficult to determine the actual reasons why people leave home and look for opportunities elsewhere – a changing environment is likely to be only one among several factors and not necessarily the most significant. For instance, having the capital to move is a major factor for migration, so only those who can afford to move in response to drought are able to.
In the case of Syria, there has been no scientifically proven link between reduced rainfall or failed crops, and rural-urban migration. The evidence that has been used to prove the drought-migration link comes from displacement reports published by the Syrian government and UN assessment missions. The two phenomena are claimed to be linked because they coincided in time. Scientifically, however, this is not enough.
The drought which affected Syria has been described as a severe, multi-year drought that lasted between 2006 and 2010. But rainfall levels in 2006, 2007, 2009 and 2010 were close to normal, both in Syria as a whole and in the northeastern “bread basket” region. This suggests that only 2008 was a real drought year.
A drought can be devastating for one community but barely noticed in another. Just look at the Kurdistan region of Iraq, which was affected by the same dry period as Syria but without any mass migration flows at the time. A community’s vulnerability to drought is more important than the drought itself.
Various factors meant Syrian farmers were particularly vulnerable to drought. An overuse of water to nourish thirsty crops such as cotton had left the land dry and degraded. The government had also cancelled subsidies for fuel used to power irrigation pumps and to take produce to market – and it had dismantled a micro-finance network that had served as an income security net. A national drought strategy that had been approved in 2006 was not implemented once the rains dried up.
By simply looking at migration flows past and present, we can see that violent conflict is rare. In fact, migration may actually strengthen social and economic conditions in receiving communities in the developing world. While urban migration does not cause development per se, sustained economic development does not occur without it.
Religious, social and ethnic integration may also improve as contact with one another increases. However, migration can also promote conflict, through increased competition for resources and services, and tensions due to ethnic and demographic changes. The potential for conflict in a given urban space is mitigated by factors such as the destination area’s ability to absorb migrants, the permanency of people’s migration, and whether there is already social and/or political instability.
In the case of Syria, there was a mass exodus of farming families from the worst drought-affected areas in the north of the country (the agricultural bread basket of Syria) to the nearby cities of Damascus, Hama and Aleppo. However, what role this migration played in helping to fuel the uprisings and then the conflict is far from clear.
What this sequence of events highlights is that the conflict is a culmination of several interconnected factors that had been steadily developing over decades. While drought, migration and conflict may all be linked by association, such links are not established facts and, in the case of Syria, they are difficult to gauge.
What can be said with much greater certainty is that economic struggles stemming from drought vulnerability, the loss of subsidies and the loss of agricultural wages did contribute to widespread dissatisfaction with the government. And it was this dissatisfaction which served as a rallying cry to unite people in opposition.
A newly published Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program (SERDP) report completed by a team comprised of researchers from the University of Arizona and Acclimatise assessed climate change impacts and adaptation on Southwestern US Department of Defense (DoD) facilities. The project aimed to:
develop and pilot-test approaches for climate risk assessment;
evaluate climate adaptation best practices in a series of case studies, and
evaluate approaches and needs for climate services to support adaptation planning compatible with DoD decision-making needs and processes.
In a four-year long process the project team interacted with DoD personnel in risk assessment workshops and case-study pilots at four installations in the Southwest, through participatory processes. They conducted interviews and convened workshops with personnel, in order to identify gaps, needs, and opportunities for infusing climate adaptation thinking and practice into DoD operations. These interviews also helped evaluate promising approaches to climate services, that mesh with military culture, leadership, and practice. Current obstacles to adopting climate adaptation measures and possible solutions to overcome these obstacles were also explored.
The research team found that integrating climate change risks into decision-making processes creates active engagement as it focusses on current challenges that can be dealt with now. Furthermore, adopting publicly available data and decision-making tools can help bases with limited resources to undertake climate risk assessments comprehensively. Finally, the study showed that while base management was receptive to climate-related actions, day to-day priorities dominate decisions and resource allocation. This is further complicated by the fact that there is rarely designated funding for climate adaptation, forcing base management to allocate already scarce funds to other competing and iften immediate priorities. Thus, mainstreaming climate into existing priorities could help tackle such budget issues.
Installations are the “front lines” of climate adaptation in the DoD and their emphasis allowed the researchers to develop a unique strategy tuned to the needs and challenges of this organizational level, including (1) assessing data and information needs, (2) assessing Base wide risk, (3) engaging personnel, (4) communicating climate change information, (5) mainstreaming climate change into DoD practice and policy, (6) addressing DoD institutional norms, leadership and partnerships, and (7) providing climate services for DoD installations and supporting DoD climate services capacity. This model shows great promise to speed the incorporation of climate adaptation planning at all levels of the DoD.
Cover photo: U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Chris Drzazgowski/Released – U.S. Air Force Airman 1st Class Koleton Mitchell, 25th Operational Weather Squadron weather forecaster, participates in a 7-mile-long ruck alongside fellow Airmen at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, one of the bases that participated in this research.